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Abstract: The objective of this study is to investigate relationship between earning management and
factors, which determine social disclosure in Indonesia companies. Sample of this study are public
companies that report social disclosure in annual report on period 2003–2006. Earning management
measurement used Jones’s Model. Whereas, regression analysis is used to explain relationship social
disclosure index as dependent variables and independent variables, that consist of earning manage-
ment, managerial ownership, leverage, size, board of commisioners and profitabilty. The results of this
study show that public companies in Indonesia, that have disclosed social activities in annual report,
conduct earning management. Beside this, the result of this study find significant relationship between
size with social diclosure. In the other hand, there is no realtionship between profitability, managerial
ownership, leverage, board of commissioners and earning management with social disclosure.
Keywords: earning management, social disclosure, agency theory, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory
Research in environmental and social disclosure
themes increase in Indonesian. Research about
environmental disclosure conducted by Suratno, et
al. (2006), explained that environmental disclosure
had significant relationship with economic perfor-
mance. However, Susi (2005) found that environ-
mental disclosure and economic performance has
no relationship. There are other studies of environ-
mental disclosure in Indonesia conducted by
Rusmana (2003) and Shodiq, et al. (2006). Both of
the studies related to management behavioral in
environmental agenda. Whereas social disclosure
research is employed by Zuchroch, et al. (2003),
they found relationship between social disclosure
and trading volume. Other research conducted by
Anggraini (2006), who found that managerial
ownership and type of industry have relationship
with social disclosure. Other findings of her research
were no relationship among size, financial leverage
and profitability with social disclosure. However,
Sembiring (2005) found that size, profile, board of
commissioner have significant relationship with
social disclosure.
Social disclosure often is related with agency
problem. Disclosure will reduce agency problem
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Veronica & Bachtiar
(2003); Halim, et al. (2005) found that disclosure
had negative relationship with earning management
in Indonesian companies. Motivation of this study
is to investigate social disclosure that can reduce
agency problem, in this case is earning management.
It is difference with Veronica & Bachtiar (2003)
and Halim, et al. (2005), they did not use social
disclosure variable to explain earning management.
Besides that, this study follow up Anggarini’s
research (2006) and Sembiring’s research (2005),
they recommended to add time of observation. Both
of prior studies were not consistent yet in determi-
nant factors that influence social disclosure.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Earning Management and Social Disclosure
Beaudoin & Agoglia (2009) explored that one
potential mitigating earning management is corpo-
rate social responsibility. According their study, the
tendency of managers to manage earnings through
discretionary accruals is influenced by their firm’s
commitment to social responsibility. Thus, corporate
boards may be able to mitigate self-interested
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behavior by fostering a socially responsible climate.
There were negative relationship between earning
management and disclosure (Halim, et al., 2005;
Veronica & Bachtiar, 2003) This findings are
consistent with opportunistic earning management
perspective. This result of this study indicated that
disclosure can reduce earning management practices.
Earning management can be explained by
bonus plan hypothesis. The bonus plan hypothesis
predict that manager with their bonus plan will
choose accounting policy to seek for maximize
utility. When they want to avoid political cost, they
will choose accounting policy that can reduce
earning reporting. Conversely, if they want to receive
more bonus, they will choose accounting policy, that
can increase earning. In other words, lower disclo-
sure rate, higher chance manager to manage earning
to opportunistic objective. It is consistent with the
role of disclosure in capital market. Healy & Palepu
(2001) stated that the role of disclosure is to reduce
asymmetry information in agency problem and
information problem. Based on prior studies, this
study formulated hypothesis:
H 1 : Earning management has negative relation-
ship with social disclosure.
Managerial Ownership and Social Disclosure
Conflict of interest between agent and principal
is greater when managerial ownership in companies
smaller (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Conversely, the
greater ownership in the company’s managers, the
more productive actions managers in maximizing
corporate value. In other words, the cost of contracts
and supervision are low. Managerial ownership can
reduce agency costs. Manager of the company will
disclose social information in order to enhance cor-
porate image, even though he had to sacrifice re-
sources for the activity (Gray, et al., 1988). Results
of research in Indonesia by Anggraini (2006) found
a positive influence between the percentage owner-
ship of management and social information disclo-
sure. Based on prior study, this research formulates
hypothesis:
H2 : Managerial ownership has positive
relationship with social disclosures.
Board of Commissioners and Social Disclosure
Existence of Corporate Governance does not
separate with agency theory. Watts & Zimmerman
(1986) explained that agency costs included moni-
toring costs and bonding costs. Corporate
governance can reduce monitoring costs because
of increasing of controlling and transparency, or
reducing information asymmetry. Many studies
explain affect from ownership composition and board
of director composition with corporate performance.
Booz-Allen & Hamilton (1998) and McKinsey &
Company (2001) in Kusumawati & Riyanto (2005)
indicated bad market assessment on corporate
governance in Indonesian. Corporate governance
mechanism also is a determinant factor of corporate
to conduct social disclosure. Coller and Gregory
(1999) stated larger board of commissioner size,
easier to controlling and monitoring CEO. Beasley
(2000), Arifin (2002) and Ujiyhanto & Pramuka
(2007) found that board of commissioners existence
can reduce agency problem with reveal social
disclosure. Beasley (2000); Arifin (2002); Sembiring
(2005) found positive relationship between size of
board commissioners and social disclosure. According
prior study, this research formulates hypothesis:
H 3 : Board of commissioners has positive relation-
ship with social disclosure.
Political Cost and Social Disclosure
The other theory, which are used by researchers
to explain social disclosure, is a political cost
hypothesis, that is based on positive accounting
theory. Grey, et al. (2001) found that larger com-
panies avoid political cost by reducing earning
reporting and more reveal social disclosure than
smaller companies.According to political cost hypo-
thesis, large companies tend to have greater political
costs than small firms. Large companies tend to
provide information on earnings is lower than small
firms, so that large companies tend to spend more
money on social disclosure than small firms. Based
on agency theory size of companies has positive
relationship with social disclosure. The studies
successfully demonstrated the positive relationship
between size and social disclosure of companies
were conducted by Karpik & Belkaoui (1989),
Adam, et al. (1998), Hackston and Milne. (1996),
Kokubu, et al. (2001), Hasibuan (2001), Gray, et
al. (2001) and Anggarini (2006). Based on prior
studies, this study formulates the hypothesis:
H4 : Size have positive relationship with social
disclosure.
Profitability and Social Disclosure
There are many different results about
empirical social disclosure studies. Those were
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caused by different theory basic. Some research
rooted on legitimacy theory and the other based on
stakeholder theory. Guthri & Parker (1990)
explained that CSR disclosure in annual report was
one of way’s corporation to sustain and to legitimate
contribution on economic and politics. O’Donovan
& Gibson (2000) explained that profitability and
social disclosure have negative relationship based
on legitimacy theory. One of the arguments in the
relationship between profitability and the level of
disclosures of social responsibility is when a com-
pany has a high rate of profit, management consi-
dered no necessary to report the things that can
disturb information about the company’s financial
success. Conversely, when low levels of profitability,
they hope users will read the report ”good news”
the company’s performance. For example in the
social sphere, and thus investors will still invest in
the company. Thus it can be said that profitability
has a negative relationship to the level of corporate
social responsibility disclosure.
Social disclosure will be different perspective
if seen from lens stakeholder theory. According to
this theory, manager tries to satisfy all stakeholders
by disclosing their social activities and then maintain
all stakeholder expectations. Involvement of
corporate in activities social is important, because
society is one of their stakeholders. Mitchel, et al.
(1997) and Belkaoui & Karpik (1989) found positive
relationship between corporate social performance
(CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP).
Satisfaction of each stakeholder group is support
instrument for companies financial performance
(Jones, 1995). Anggraini (2006) found positive
significant relationship between profitability and
social disclosure in Indonesian Companies. Based
prior study this research formulates hypothesis:
H5 : Profitability has positive relationship with
social disclosure.
Leverage and Social Disclosure
Debt contract showed in financial leverage rate.
Financial leverage used to limit managerial capacity
to transfer of assets between stockholder and bondholder
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The debt contract filled
about rules, which corporate must maintain leverage
rate (Watt & Zimmerman, 1990). Higher leverage
has more chance for manager to break rule of debt
contract, so that corporate will report higher earning
(Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989). In order to increase
earning reporting, manager has to reduce costs,
included cost to disclose social information. Belkaoui
& Karpik (1989) illuminate that decision to reveal
social information will follow expenditure of disclo-
sure that can reduce revenue. Agency theory pre-
dicts that companies with higher financial leverage
will reveal more information, because agency cost
of company with such capital structure is higher.
Additional information is needed to eliminate doubts
bondholders against the fulfillment of their rights as
creditors. Therefore, firms with high leverage ratios
have obligation to conduct a broader expression than
firms with low leverage ratios. In the agency theory
perspective, companies which have high financial
leverage ratio will reduce social disclosure to avoid
the spotlight from the debt holders. Belkaoui &
Karpik (1989); Cormier & Magnan (1999) and
Anggraini (2006) found negative relationship bet-
ween financial leverage and social disclosure. Based
on prior study, this study formulates hypothesis:
H6 : Leverage has negative relationship with social
disclosure.
Method
Data and Sample Selection
Out of 354 companies listed on The Jakarta
Stock Exchange in the period 2003 to 2006. There
are 91 companies revealed social disclosure of 354
companies. 46 companies were selected as sample
out of the 91companies. The selection of sample
had to meet the following criteria: (1) They have
been registered on the Jakarta Stock Exchange for
at lest four years (2003–2006). (2) They have
published financial statements completely, included
social disclosure. (3) Information of board of commissi-
o-ner and managerial ownership are available.
Information or data of this research collected
from Indonesian Capital Market Directory. Infor-
mation of corporate social disclosure collected uses
criteria from Sayekti &Wodanbio (2008). There are
78 items covered environmental, energy, health and
safety of workers, other about employee, product,
other and community involvement.
Variables Measurement
Variables measurement of this study can see
below.
Analytical Model
Analytical model used to test the hypotheses.
The regression model is as follows:
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Y= 0 + 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 + 4X4 + 5X5+6X6 + e
Where:
Y : Social Disclosure Index
X1 : earning management
X2 : managerial ownership






Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation
for each variable. The mean was 0.0318 with stan-
dard deviation of 0.02175 for social disclosure index.
The mean of each independent variables can see in
table 2.
Table 3 shows the result of the regressions
mode that used in this research. This model uses
social disclosure with social disclosure index model
Table 1. Variables Measurement
Variables Measurements
Social Disclosure Index Social disclosure measurement based on Corporate Social Responsibility
Index developed by Hanifa & Cooke (2005). This method used dichotomy
approach in each item on social disclosure, it will be given score 1 if item
disclose present and score 0 if no present. Then, score of each item is
added to get total score for each company.
Earning management Discretionary accrual based on Jones’s model (Setyawati, 2002).
Managerial ownership Percentage of stock ownership  by managers (Sembiring, 2005)
Board of Commissioners Number of  board of commissioners  in each company, based on Beasley
(2000) in Sembiring (2005)
Size size measurement used  total assets, based on Waddock & Graves (1997)
in Fauzi et al. (2007)
Profitability This study used Return On Assets (ROA)  based on Mahoney
and Roberts (2007)
Leverage Debt to equity ratio based on Kokubu et al.(2000), in Sembiring (2005)
Table 2. Descriptive Statistic
Variables N Mean SD
Social Disclosure Index 46 .0318 .02175
Earning Management 46 .0208 .06065
Managerial Ownership 46 3.1485 4.87893
Leverage 46 2.8972 6.59669
Size 46 2275150.7 7294161.0347
Board of  Commissioners 46 4.1957 2.05069
Profitability 46 84.3511 212.54735
Table 3. Regression Analysis Social Disclosure Index as Dependent Variable
Earning Management -.185 .053 -1.251 .219
Managerial Ownership .115 .001 .744 .461
Leverage .248 .000 1.634 .110
Size .510 .000 1.810 .078
Board of  Commissioner -.324 .002 -1.418 .164
Profitability -.050 .000 -.201 .841
Model Summary
Adjusted R Square .057
F statistics 1.456
Prob. .219
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according to Hanifa & Cooke (2005) as dependent
variable. Whereas, each of independent variable
includes earning management, managerial owner-
ship, leverage, size, board of commissioner and
profitability. Based on table 3, only size variable has
positive significant relationship with social disclosure
at p<0.078. However earning management, mana-
gerial ownership, leverage, board of commissioners
and profitability does not have relationship with
social disclosure. The results of regression analysis
of social disclosure’s influence factors indicates and
gives evidence to reject hypothesis 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and
supports hypothesis 5.
Using to model summary table, indicating
Adjusted R Square is 0.057 or 5.7%. This result
presents only 5,7 % of all dependent variables affect
dependent variable. In other word, earning manage-
ment, managerial ownership, board of commissio-
ners, profitability, size and leverage are little factors
that determine social disclosure in sample com-
panies. There are 94,3% other factors that affect
social disclosure. Future research can explore more
other variables that affect social disclosure.
Earning management does not have relationship
with social disclosure. This results reject hypothesis1,
that state earning management has negative relation-
ship with social disclosure. Finding of this study is
inconsistent with Halim, et al. (2005); Veronica &
Bachtiar (2003); Lobo & Zou (2001). All studies,
based on agency theory, found that disclosure have
negative relationship with earning management and
disclosure. This study also is not supported byHealy
& Palepu (2001), who stated disclosure can reduce
agency problem, and Baudoin & Agoglia (2009)
who found potential mitigating earning management
is corporate social responsibility. Although the result
is fail to support the hypothesis, but this result indi-
cates negative relationship direction of two varia-
bles. The finding can be explored wider in the future
research.
Table 2 shows mean and standard deviation of
earning management are 2,08% and 6,065%. In
addition, the minimum and maximum score of
earning management are -0.0966 and 0.160749.
Minus sign indicates that manager increase earning.
However, plus sign indicates manager decreasing
earning. Mean of earning management is 2,08%
that indicates manager increase earning. This result
indicates earning management practice was con-
ducted by Indonesian companies that reveal social
disclosure.
Managerial ownership did not have relationship
with social disclosure. The finding is different with
Anggraini (2006). According to Anggraini (2006)
managerial ownership, one of the factors affects
social disclosure. This study can not support agency
theory that explains managerial ownership can
reduce agency cost. Based on agency theory, mana-
ger of the company will disclose social information
in order to enhance corporate image, even though
he had to sacrifice resources for the activity (Gray,
et al., 1988). Based on this study, managerial owner-
ship in companies that conducted earning manage-
ment is not one of factors which determined social
disclosure.
Based on table 3, board of commissioner varia-
ble did not have significant relationship with social
disclosure. The results reject hypothesis 3 that
predict board of commissioners have positive rela-
tionship with social disclosure. The finding of this
study is different with Coller & Gregory (1999);
Sembiring (2005); Anggraini (2006) who found
significant positive relationship in both variables.
Although this results does not have significant rela-
tionship, there is negative direction between board
of commissioner with social disclosure. Negative
relationship of both variables were found by
Yermack (1996); Beaslley (1996); Jensen (1993)
in Ujiyhanto & Pramuka (2007).
According to prior study, it can be said that
smaller size of board commissioners more effective
make controlling than larger one. Larger size of
board commissioners considered less effective in
conducting their functions because of difficulty in
communication, coordination and decision making
(Ujiyhanto & Pramuka, 2007). This study lead to a
fact that smaller size board of commissioners has
high social disclosures. In other word, relationship
of both variables is negative. Briefly, Indonesian
companies better use small size of board commissio-
ners. Findings of this study does not support agency
theory. Agency theory perspective considers that
good corporate mechanism on corporate that has
larger board of commissioners have higher social
disclosure rate. Board commissioners are expected
can reduce agency cost with disclose more social
information. Sembiring (2005) and Anggraini (2006)
supported this theory. They found positive relation-
ship board of commissioners with social disclosures
in Indonesian companies.
Hypothesis 4, size has positive significant
relationship with social disclosure, support political
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cost hypothesis. This findings is consistent with
Belkaoui & Karpik (1989), Adam, et al. (1995,
1998), Hackston dan Milne (1996), Kokubu, et al.
(2001), Hasibuan (2001); Gray, et al. (2001),
Sembiring (2005); Fauzi, et al. (2007). This result
explains companies which have larger total assets
tend to disclose more social information than smaller.
Size is used proxy to political cost hypothesis. In
this case, size of Indonesian Companies supports
to political cost hypothesis related social disclosure.
Table 3 indicates profitability does not relation
with social disclosure. This result fail to support
hypothesis 5 that state profitability have positive
relation with social disclosure. This result is different
to Anggrani (2006); Belkaoui & Karpik (1989);
Mitchel, et al. (1997) who used stakeholder theory.
In this theory, social disclosure can increase image
companies, and then it will affect financial perfor-
mance. Briefly, stakeholder predict positive relation
between social disclosure and financial performance.
Although have no significant relation between
profitability and social disclosure, this research indi-
cated negative direction in both of variables relation-
ship. Negative relationship in both variables based
on legitimacy theory, but social disclosure prefer
based on legitimacy strategy (Gray, Owen, and
Adams, 1996). O’Donovan and Gibson (2000) found
profitability have negative relation with social dis-
closure. Based on this study, higher profitability of
Indonesian companies considered as good news.
Shortly, social disclosures are not necessary to attract
public interest. However, when rate of profitability
is low, social disclosure is important to attract public
interest.
Leverage does not relationship with social
disclosure. This result rejects hypothesis 6. Relation
direction between leverage and social disclosure,
based on this study, indicates positive relationship,
although it is not significant. This finding opposites
with Belkoui & Karpik (1989), Cormier & Magnaan
(1999); Anggraini (2006) that faund negative signi-
ficant for both variables relationship. Skipper (1999)
in Marwata (2001); Meek (1995) in Fitriany (2001)
found positive relationship between leverage and
disclosure. Because of additional information in the
form of social disclosure is necessary to remove
doubts bondholders against the fulfillment of their
rights as creditors. Therefore companies with high
leverage ratios have the obligation to conduct a
broader expression than firms with low leverage
ratios.
Conclusion, Implication, Limitation
Overall, result of this study concluded that only
variable size have positive relation with social disclo-
sure. This results support the hypothesis of study,
which state size has positive relationship with social
disclosure based on agency theory. However, result
of this study fails to confirm agency theory about earning
management, board of commissioners, managerial
ownership and leverage. Besides that, this study
fails to support legitimacy theory. According to this
theory, profitability has negative relationship with
social disclosure.
Policy implication of this study is social disclo-
sure can reduce opportunistic earning management
perspective. Despites of, results of this study have
not presented negative significant relationship bet-
ween social disclosure and earning management,
but the results indicated negative relation direction.
According this finding, regulator can considering
social disclosure as mandatory disclosure to avoid
management opportunistic behavior.
Small number of sample is limitation in this
research. If it is compared with Anggraini (2006)
and Sembiring (2005) the sample size of study
smaller than both research. Sample of this study
only considered companies that conduct earning
management. Future research can add number of
observation. Besides that, future research can used
other variables which predict affect social disclosure,
for instance motivation of manager, cost of capital
and innovation expenditure.
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